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Abstract	  In	   this	   paper	   we	   take	   on	   the	   role	   of	   a	   ‘virtual	   consultant’	   to	   a	   potentially	  independent	  Scotland.	  What	  should	  the	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	   look	   like?	   We	   argue	   that	   the	   current	   proposal	   of	   the	   Scottish	  government	   to	   remain	   part	   of	   the	   sterling	   zone	   is	   doomed	   to	   failure,	   both	  because	  it	  falls	  short	  of	  a	  full	  political	  and	  monetary	  union	  and	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  post	  independence.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	   only	   tenable	   solution	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   is	   to	   have	   a	   separate	  currency	  and	   for	   this	   currency	   to	  have	   some	   flexibility	   against	   Scotland’s	  main	  trading	  partners.	  One	  option	  offered	  here	   is	  a	  managed	  float	  or	  crawl	  against	  a	  basket	  of	  currencies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is a revised and amended version of MacDonald (2010) 
	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  appropriate	  currency	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  the	  defining	  issue	  in	  the	  independence	  debate.	  The	  options	  discussed	  usually	  consist	  of	  joining	  the	  European	  monetary	  union,	  and	  therefore	  adopting	  the	  euro	  as	  the	  currency,	  staying	  with	  the	  sterling	  zone	  and	  having	  the	  pound	  sterling	  as	  the	  currency	  or	  creating	  a	  new	  currency	  which	  could	  then	  float	  or	  be	  managed	  in	  some	  way	  against	  other	  currencies.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  review	  the	  critical	  issues	  concerning	  the	  currency	  choice.	  Although	  some	  of	  this	  ground	  has	  recently	  been	  covered	  by	  others,	  we	  intend	  covering	  new	  ground	  and	  also	  making	  a	  new	  recommendation	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  a	  new	  currency	  regime	  could	  work	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  Our	  perspective	  on	  the	  appropriate	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  fixed	  versus	  floating	  exchange	  rates.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  not	  of	  course	  about	  arguing	  the	  case	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  Rather,	  it	  takes	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  consultant’s	  report	  –	  what	  if	  Scotland	  were	  independent	  what	  should	  the	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  look	  like?	  Would	  it	  look	  like	  the	  sterling	  zone	  regime	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  is	  currently	  running	  with	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  or	  would	  it	  look	  different?	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  if	  Scotland	  were	  to	  become	  independent	  it	  would	  be	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  hydrocarbons	  and	  this	  would	  have	  crucial	  and	  important	  implications	  for	  Scotland’s	  exchange	  rate,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  actual	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  adopted	  (fixed	  to	  sterling	  or	  the	  euro	  or	  floating)	  and	  this	  must,	  we	  would	  argue,	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  design	  of	  any	  exchange	  rate	  regime.	  	  	  	  
In	  thinking	  about	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  issues	  for	  any	  country	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  real	  and	  a	  nominal	  exchange	  rate.	  The	  latter	  is	  simply	  the	  exchange	  rate	  we	  observe	  on	  currency	  markets	  –	  for	  example	  the	  sterling	  dollar	  exchange	  rate,	  currently	  around	  1.57	  –	  while	  the	  former	  is	  the	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  adjusted	  for	  prices	  in	  the	  home	  country	  relative	  to	  the	  foreign	  country.2	  	  Although	  Scotland	  currently	  does	  not	  of	  course	  have	  a	  separately	  defined	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  at	  the	  moment,	  it	  does	  have	  an	  implicit	  real	  exchange	  rate	  that	  would	  be	  defined	  simply	  as	  the	  home	  price	  relative	  to	  the	  comparable	  price	  of	  our	  trading	  partner(s)	  price.	  Although	  nominal	  exchange	  rates	  are	  usually	  defined	  on	  a	  bilateral	  basis,	  real	  rates	  are	  commonly	  defined	  on	  an	  effective	  basis;	  that	  is	  the	  home	  price,	  relative	  to	  weighted	  prices	  all	  of	  our	  trading	  partners	  prices.	  If	  Scotland	  were	  to	  become	  independent	  we	  shall	  assume	  its	  currency	  would	  be	  the	  Scots	  pound.	  	  	  As	  has	  now	  been	  well	  known	  since	  the	  early	  literature	  on	  the	  asset	  market	  approach	  to	  the	  exchange	  rate	  (see	  MacDonald	  1988,	  2007),	  expectations	  are	  a	  critically	  important	  factor	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  exchange	  rates	  since	  they	  link	  the	  present	  to	  the	  future.	  Since	  a	  currency	  is	  a	  long-­‐lived	  asset	  (potentially	  infinite)	  and	  although	  current	  events,	  such	  as	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  movements,	  can	  have	  an	  important	  bearing	  on	  the	  currency,	  expected	  future	  events	  can	  have	  a	  very	  powerful	  effect	  on	  today’s	  exchange	  rate.	  For	  example,	  the	  market’s	  expectation	  of	  the	  development	  of	  monetary	  policy/	  inflation	  and	  the	  course	  of	  commodity	  prices,	  for	  a	  net	  commodity	  exporter,	  can	  have	  an	  important	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In formal terms it would be defined as Q=SP/P*, where Q is the real exchange rate, S is the nominal 
exchange rate. 
powerful	  effect	  on	  today’s	  exchange	  rate,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  change	  in	  the	  current	  values	  taking	  place.	  We	  believe	  this	  aspect	  is	  crucially	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  debate	  since	  market	  sentiment	  and	  the	  underlying	  expectations	  will	  punish	  a	  country	  severely	  for	  making	  inconsistent	  statements	  regarding	  its	  choice	  of	  a	  currency	  regime.	  	  	  Resource	  shocks	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  extremely	  important	  for	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  of	  a	  politically	  independent	  Scotland	  if,	  as	  the	  SNP	  has	  argued,	  the	  oil	  off	  Scotland’s	  maritime	  coast	  is	  indeed	  Scotland’s	  oil,	  although	  this	  is	  contested	  by	  some	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Prof	  John	  Patterson	  Aberdeen	  University	  May	  13).	  Indeed,	  although	  no	  accurate	  data	  are	  currently	  available	  on	  what	  Scotland’s	  net	  oil	  and	  gas	  exports	  will	  be,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  clear	  that	  Scotland	  would	  be	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  hydrocarbons.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  this	  will	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  Scotland’s	  real	  exchange	  rate	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  and	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  design	  of	  an	  appropriate	  exchange	  rate	  regime.	  	  	  As	  Bordo	  and	  MacDonald	  (2012)	  make	  clear,	  the	  essence	  of	  an	  effective	  and	  well-­‐designed	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  is	  that	  it	  should	  be	  a	  credible	  regime	  and	  it	  should	  offer	  an	  effective	  adjustment	  mechanism	  to	  relevant	  shocks.	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  the	  real	  exchange	  rate	  is	  likely	  to	  move	  in	  a	  very	  different	  way	  to	  its	  movement	  today.	  This	  is	  because	  oil	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  budget	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  and	  as	  a	  resource	  dependent	  economy	  so-­‐called	  oil	  shocks	  could	  move	  the	  real	  exchange	  rate	  around	  a	  lot	  with	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  competiveness	  of	  the	  non-­‐oil	  sector,	  and	  output	  and	  employment	  in	  that	  sector	  and	  more	  generally	  inflation	  relative	  to	  
our	  trading	  partners.	  Normally	  in	  a	  resource	  dependent	  economy	  the	  government	  would	  let	  the	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  adjust	  and	  take	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  strain.	  So	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  an	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  that	  did	  not	  allow	  some	  flexibility	  for	  the	  Scots	  pound	  would	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  credible	  by	  financial	  markets.	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  we	  turn	  to	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  	  The	  outline	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  consider	  the	  various	  exchange	  rate	  regimes	  options	  open	  to	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  Before	  discussing	  the	  macroeconomic	  issues	  regarding	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  choice,	  in	  Section	  3	  we	  consider	  the	  microeconomic	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  participating	  in	  a	  currency	  union.	  We	  then	  go	  on	  in	  Section	  4	  to	  use	  the	  optimum	  currency	  area	  literature	  to	  have	  a	  first	  pass	  on	  what	  a	  sensible	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  would	  look	  like	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  In	  section	  5	  we	  build	  on	  this	  by	  considering	  the	  classic	  case	  for	  fixed	  versus	  floating	  exchange	  rates.	  The	  practical	  implementation	  of	  various	  currency	  options	  available	  to	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  is	  considered	  in	  Section	  6.	  Section	  7	  concludes.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Variant	  Exchange	  Rate	  Regimes.	  In	   this	   section	   we	   outline	   the	   various	   exchange	   rate	   regime	   options	  available	   to	   an	   independent	   country	   and	  we	   note	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	  rigidly	   fixed	   and	   floating	   exchange	   rates	   in	   reality	   is	   not	   as	   stark	   as	   this	  polarisation	  suggests,	  as	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  shades	  of	  grey	  between	  the	  polar	  cases	  –	  or	  corner	  solutions.	  The	  IMF	  has	  usefully	  fleshed	  out	  the	  rich	  variety	  of	  
intermediate	  cases	  between	  the	  so-­‐called	  corner	  positions	  of	  a	  pure	  float	  and	  an	  irrevocably	   fixed	   exchange	   rate.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   our	   discussions	   of	   the	  appropriate	   regime	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland,	   it	   is	  worth	   listing	  what	   these	  are	  and	  we	  do	  this	  in	  Table	  1,	  where	  we	  have	  9	  intermediate	  cases	  between	  the	  two	  extreme	  corners	  of	  a	  pure	   float	  and	  participation	   in	  a	   full	  blown	  monetary	  union,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  have	  numerous	  further	  variants.	  	  	  
Table	  1.	  Exchange	  Rate	  Regime	  Classifications	  
Floating	  corner	   Intermediate	  Regimes	   Rigidly	  Fixed	  Corner	  Pure	  float	   Band	   Currency	  board	  Managed	  or	  dirty	  Float	   Crawling	  Peg	  	   Dollar-­‐	  Sterling-­‐and	  Euro-­‐isation	  	   Basket	  Peg	   Commodity	  Standard	  	  	   Adjustable	  Peg	   Monetary	  Union	  without	  Political	  Union	  	   	   Monetary	  Union	  with	  Political	  Union	  	  	   In	  the	  first	  cell	  we	  have	  the	  most	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  and	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  cell	  we	  have	  the	  least	  flexible	  and	  most	  rigid	  regime,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  monetary	   union	   combined	   with	   a	   political	   union.	   These	   are	   the	   two	   extreme	  corner	   cases.	   In	   between	   the	   corner	   cases	   there	   are	   a	   range	   of	   options	  distinguished	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility.	  A	  managed	  float	  can	  be	  very	  close	  to	  a	  pure	  float,	  if	  the	  monetary	  authorities	  only	  intervene	  occasionally	  and	  in	  small	  amounts,	  or	  it	  can	  approximate	  something	  closer	  to	  an	  intermediate	  regime	   if	   the	   authorities	   intervene	   on	   a	  more	   or	   less	   continuous	   basis	   to,	   say,	  satisfy	   an	   inflation	   target	   (such	   as	   has	   been	   the	   case	   in	   Singapore).	   Banded	  regimes	   are	   designed	   to	   capture	   the	   target	   zone	   arrangements	   of	   Bergsten-­‐
Williamson	  (in	  which	  the	  band	   is	  defined	  around	  the	  Fundamental	  Equilibrium	  Exchange	  Rate,	  or	  FEER)	  and	  Krugman	  (in	  which	   the	  band	   is	  defined	  around	  a	  fixed	   central	   parity).	   A	   crawling	   peg	   system	   is	   one	   in	   which	   the	   peg	   changes,	  usually	  to	  accommodate	  inflation	  –	  an	  indexed	  crawl	  –	  or	  is	  a	  preannouced	  crawl	  to	  maintain	  competitiveness.	  	  A	  basket	  peg	  is	  where	  a	  currency	  is	  fixed	  relative	  to	  a	  basket	  of	  its	  trading	  partner	  currencies	  and	  an	  adjustable	  peg	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  currency	  has	  a	  fixed	  central	   rate	   but	   it	   can	   be	   changed	   to,	   say,	   accommodate	   disequilibria	   such	   as	  those	   occurring	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	   (such	   as	   occurred	   in	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	  system).	  In	  the	  rigidly	  fixed	  corner	  we	  have	  the	  currency	  board	  solution	  that	  usually	   involves	  a	  country	  pegging	   to	  another	  currency	   (usually	   the	  dollar	  and	   the	   euro	  but	   perhaps	   also	   sterling)	   and	   allowing	   the	  home	   currency	   to	   be	  transferred	  into	  the	  foreign	  at	  the	  going	  rate.	  A	  Commodity	  standard	  is	  where	  a	  country	  fixes	  its	  exchange	  rate	  to	  the	  price	  of	  a	  commodity,	  which	  is	  traditionally	  taken	  to	  be	  gold	  (i.e.	  from	  the	  various	  gold	  standard	  experiences)	  and,	  finally,	  we	  have	   the	   monetary	   union	   cases	   that	   we	   have	   differentiated	   with	   respect	   to	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   involve	   a	   political	   union	   or	   not.	   This	   we	   believe	   is	   an	  important	  distinction	  because,	  and	  as	  the	  recent	  European	  experience	  has	  made	  clear,	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   political	   union	   means	   that	   the	   fixed	   parity	   cannot	   be	  regarded	  as	   irrevocable	  and	  this	  means	  what	   is	  being	  considered	  is	  a	   form	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  but	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below	  it	  has	  few	  if	  any	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  a	  properly	  designed	  fixed	  exchange	  rate.	  As	   Svensson	   (1994)	   made	   clear	   most	   historical	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	  regimes	  were	  not	  truly	  fixed	  but	  had	  some	  flexibility	  built	  into	  them.	  This	  was	  so	  even	  in	  the	  classical	  Gold	  standard	  system,	  which	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  example	  




3.	  Microeconomic	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  participating	  in	  a	  monetary	  union.	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  macroeconomic	  discussion	  of	  the	  fixed	  versus	  floating	  exchange	  rates,	  we	  first	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  microeconomic	  benefits	  of	  participating	  in	  a	  monetary	  union	  versus	  have	  an	  independent	  currency.	  	  The	  first	  microeconomic	  benefit	  of	  participating	  in	  a	  monetary	  union	  is	  the	  transaction	  cost	  savings.	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  functions	  of	  money	  is	  to	  act	  as	  a	  medium	  of	  exchange	  and	  this	  medium	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  network	  externality	  (Buiter	  (2000)):	  that	  is,	  the usefulness of a medium of exchange increases in the number of 
other economic agents accept it in exchange for goods, services and other financial 
assets. So by eliminating the need for the exchange of one currency for another, a 
monetary union saves real resources. Of course given that Scotland is already part of a 
monetary union additional costs would be incurred if it moved to its own currency. 
Such costs would be one off up front costs that could be substantial at both the 
wholesale and retail money market levels. Since there is no recent experience of a 
Scottish currency it is likely that many goods and services would still be invoiced in 
terms of sterling post independence.  
 
The transaction costs savings of Scotland’s continued participation in the sterling 
zone monetary are hard to estimate but if we take the euro zone experience as a guide, 
in its report One market, one money (European Economy, 1990), the Commission of 
the European Communities estimated the permanent flow of exchange transaction 
costs savings at about 0.5% of GDP for the 15 member Community as a whole. But 
this involved the abolition of 14 national currencies and their replacement by a single 
currency. In the case of Scotland sticking with the sterling zone there is effectively 
only one currency to consider and so the cost savings are likely to be lower than the 
0.5% figure. But the foreign exchange transaction costs savings should need to be 
augmented by the transaction costs saved in not having to provide financial 
instruments denominated in the national currency to hedge exchange risk 
considerations. For example, in an independent Scotland with a separate currency, an 
investor would have the ability to switch from Scottish Treasury bills to UK Treasury 
bills.  
 
The magnitude of the so-called switching costs from sterling to the Scottish pound are 
even harder to estimate. For the UK experience of considering joining the euro, 
competing estimates differ by one and sometimes two orders of magnitude. The 
switching costs do not just involve the administrative, legal and hardware cost of re-
denominating all contracts, changing vending machines etc., but also the 
psychological costs of having to compute prices with a new numéraire. With 
boundedly rational individuals, these costs will always be there and are likely to be 
significant for a country moving to a new currency (Buiter (2000)).  
 
The final microeconomic benefit that a common currency achieves is the greater price 
transparency it creates. Price discrimination and market segmentation are supposedly 
discouraged when buyers can more easily engage in shopping where they can 
compare prices as is now common with online shopping so competition is enhanced. 
Although the costs of Scotland having a separate currency could well be large and 
significant we would argue that the dynamic costs of getting the exchange rate regime 
would easily dominate the microeconomic costs. 	  
	  
4.	  The	  determinants	  of	  exchange	  rate	  regimes:	  the	  optimum	  currency	  area	  
criteria	  If	  in	  the	  design	  of	  an	  exchange	  rate	  system	  for	  an	  independent	  country	  a	  policy	  maker	  is	  trying	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  two	  corner	  cases	  noted	  above	  how	  would	  she	  choose?	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  perhaps	  the	  best-­‐known	  guide	  to	  what	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  for	  a	  country	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  optimal	  currency	  area	  (OCA)	  literature.	  The	  OCA	  literature	  considers	  the	  following	  kind	  of	  issue.	  Consider	  two	  countries	  -­‐	  the	  RUK	  (an	  oil	  importing	  country)	  and	  Scotland	  (an	  oil	  exporting	  country)	  –	  with	  each	  country	  having	  an	  independent	  monetary	  policy	  (that	  is,	  they	  have	  independent	  central	  banks,	  interest	  rates	  and	  exchange	  rates).	  The	  countries	  are	  considering	  relinquishing	  this	  monetary	  independence	  and	  forming	  a	  monetary	  union.	  Should	  they?	  The	  following	  characteristics	  have	  been	  argued	  to	  favour	  having	  a	  national	  currency,	  and	  the	  associated	  scope	  for	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility.	  (1)	   A	   high	   degree	   of	   nominal	   rigidity	   in	   domestic	   prices	   and/or	   costs	  (Mundell	  (1961)).	  (2)	  A	  relatively	  low	  degree	  of	  openness	  to	  trade	  in	  real	  goods	  and	   services	   (McKinnon	   (1963)).	   (3)	  A	   less	   diversified	   structure	   of	   production	  and	  demand	  (Kenen	  (1969).	  (4)	  A	  low	  degree	  of	  real	  factor	  mobility	  (especially	  labour	   mobility)	   across	   national	   boundaries	   (Mundell	   (1961).	   (5)	   Absence	   of	  significant	  international	  (and	  supra-­‐national)	  fiscal	  tax-­‐transfer	  mechanisms.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Scottish	  currency	  has	  focused	  on	  these	  different	  criteria	  for	  staying	  as	  part	  of	  the	  sterling	  zone.	  For	  example,	  both	  the	   Scottish	  Governments	   Fiscal	   Commission	   and	  HMT	   refer	   to	   the	   close	   trade	  links	   and	   labour	  mobility	   between	   Scotland	   and	   RUK	   as	   key	   reasons	   why	   the	  Sterling	  zone	  is	  an	  OCA	  and	  therefore	  for	  maintaining	  the	  fixed	  link	  between	  the	  
Scots	   pound	   and	   sterling.	   	   Others	   (for	   example,	   Jim	   and	   Margaret	   Cuthbert),	  however,	   have	   cited	   the	   differing	   industrial	   /	   economic	   structure	   in	   Scotland	  compared	  to	  the	  SE	  of	  England	  and	  argued	  that	  this	  alone	  implies	  that	  Scotland	  does	  not	  form	  an	  optimum	  currency	  area	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  	  	  	  However,	   the	   recent	   focus	   in	   the	   OCA	   literature	   has	   turned	   from	   these	  single	   criterion	  approaches	   to	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	   shocks	  affecting	  economies	  or	  regions,	  since	  ‘shock	  absorption’	  is	  seen	  to	  combine	  the	  net	   influence	  of	  several	  of	   the	   traditional	   criteria.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   different	   aspects	   to	   this	  approach,	  for	  example:	  are	  the	  shocks	  facing	  a	  country	  symmetric	  or	  asymmetric,	  that	  is,	  do	  they	  have	  a	  common	  or	  differential	  effect?;	  are	  the	  shocks	  temporary	  or	   permanent?;	   what	   are	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   shocks	   –	   are	   they	   supply	   side	   or	  demand	   side	   shocks?;	   even	   if	   the	   shocks	   facing	   two	   countries	   /regions	   are	  symmetric,	   or	   common,	   do	   they	   have	   seriously	   asymmetric	   impacts	   on	  employment	  and	  output?	  A high incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks 
rather than symmetric or common shocks and/or dissimilarities in national economic 
structures or transmission mechanisms that cause even symmetric shocks to have 
asymmetric consequences.	  If	   Scotland	   were	   to	   become	   an	   independent	   nation	   it	   would	   in	   all	  likelihood	  be	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  hydrocarbons	  whereas	   its	  near	  neighbour,	  RUK,	  would	  remain	  a	  net	  importer	  of	  oil.	  Hence	  if	  there	  are	  shocks	  to	  the	  price	  of	  oil,	  which	   there	   are	   bound	   to	   be,	   these	   would	   be	   classified	   as	   assymetric	   shock	  between	  the	  two	  areas.	  The	  policy	  response	  in	  an	  oil	  exporting	  country	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  different	  depending	  on	  the	  source	  of	  the	  oil	  shock	  (which	  we	  assume	  here	  is	   a	   positive	   shock)	   -­‐	   supply	   (exogenous	   changes	   in	   production)	   or	   demand	  (changes	  in	  consumption).	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  supply	  side	  shock	  the	  oil	  
exporting	   country	   would	   probably	   want	   to	   have	   a	   tight	   monetary	   policy	   to	  control	   inflation,	   while	   the	   oil	   importing	   country	   would	   want	   a	   more	  expansionary	   monetary	   policy	   to	   maintain	   demand	   for	   its	   other	   goods	   and	  services.	   If	   supply	   side	   shocks	   predominate	   this	   in	   itself	   would	   provide	   a	  convincing	   case	   for	   retaining	   exchange	   rate	   flexibility	   rather	   than	   entering	   a	  monetary	  union.	   In	  contrast,	   if	   the	  high	  price	  of	  oil	  represents	  a	  demand	  shock	  (i.e.	  an	  increased	  demand	  from	  China	  and	  India)	  then	  the	  policy	  response	  in	  both	  the	   importing	   and	   exporting	   currency	   should	   be	   the	   same,	   namely	   tighter	  monetary	  policy.	   So	   if	  demand	  shocks	  predominate,	   this	  would	   seem	   to	   favour	  pegging	   the	   currency	   of	   the	   oil	   exporter	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   a	  fixed	   exchange	   rate	  while	   if	   it	   is	   supply	   side	   shocks	   that	   dominate	   this	  would	  favour	  more	  flexibility.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  often	  difficult	  in	  practice	  to	  gauge	  how	  much	  of	  an	  oil	  price	  change	   is	   coming	   from	   the	   supply	   side	   or	   the	   demand	   side,	   just	   as	   it	   is	   often	  difficult	   to	   gauge	   how	  much	   of	   a	   price	   change	   is	   due	   to	   permanent	   forces	   and	  how	  much	   is	   temporary	   (temporary	  changes	  would	  not	  necessitate	   the	  kind	  of	  real	  exchange	  rate	  response	  we	  have	  advocated	  above	  and	  therefore	  would	  not	  have	   implication	   for	   the	   regime	   choice).	   For	   example,	   a	   permanent	   increase	   in	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  requires	  reduced	  levels	  of	  consumption	  and	  investment	  in	  the	  oil	  importing	  country	  and	  a	  real	  depreciation	  of	  its	  currency,	  whereas	  the	  opposite	  should	  be	  happening	  in	  the	  oil	  exporting	  country:	  higher	   levels	  of	  consumption	  and	  investment	  and	  a	  real	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation.	  Despite	  the	  difficulties	  in	  unraveling	  permanent	  versus	  temporary	  and	  supply	  versus	  demand	  shocks,	  we	  would	  argue	  that	   the	  key	  message	  here	   is	   that	  Scotland	  would	  need	  to	  have	  an	  independent	  currency	  and	  we	  concur	  with	  the	  basic	  insight	  of	  Mundell’s	  (1961)	  
seminal	   paper	   that	   two	   countries	   with	   assymetrical	   shocks	   should	   not	   have	   a	  fixed	   exchange	   rate,	   but	   should	   have	   some	   flexibility	   in	   their	   exchange	   rate	  behaviour.	  	  	  It	   is	   of	   course	   possible	   to	   achieve	   the	   kind	   of	   adjustment	   required	   and	  noted	   above	   with	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate,	   but	   the	   problem	   here	   is	   that	   the	  countries	   in	  question	  have	   to	  wait	  on	   the	  appropriate	   inflationary	  mix	   to	  bring	  this	  about	  and	  this	  can	  be	  long	  drawn	  out	  and,	  indeed,	  by	  the	  time	  an	  appropriate	  adjustment	   has	   taken	   place	   it	   may	   be	   time	   for	   the	   opposite	   policy	   response.	  Having	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility	  clearly	  makes	  this	  process	  much	  easier	  although	  a	  country	  with	  an	   important	   traded	  sector	   in	  addition	  to	   its	  oil	  sector	  would	  need	  to	  use	  imaginative	  policies	  to	  keep	  both	  sectors	  in	  balance.	  In	   sum,	   we	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   section	   that	   an	   independent	   Scotland	  would	  not	  want	  to	  be	  on	  the	  fixed	  rate	  corner	  but	  would	  want	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  the	  flexible	  rate	  corner.	  But	  how	  close?	  	  	  	  	  
5.	  Fixed	  Versus	  Floating	  Exchange	  Rates.	  	  To	   complement	   our	   discussion	   of	   the	   Optimum	   Currency	   Area	   criteria,	   in	   this	  section	  we	  overview	   the	   respective	   cases	   for	   fixed	  and	   flexible	   exchange	   rates,	  with	   a	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	   needs	   of	   an	   independent	   Scotland.	   As	  we	  have	  noted,	   although	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   would	   be	   a	   net	   exporter	   of	  hydrocarbons,	   assuming	   the	   oil	   in	   Scotland’s	   territorial	   waters	   could	   be	  negotiated	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland,	   it	   would	   be	   unlike	   most	   other	   net	  hydrocarbon	   producers,	   who	   are	   essentially	   single	   commodity	   exporters,	  because	   it	   has	   an	   important	   traded	   sector,	   particularly	   in	   financial	   services,	  tourism	  and	  food	  and	  drink.	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  important	  non-­‐oil	  sector	  has	  to	  
be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  design	  of	  an	  appropriate	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  	  
5.1	  The	  advantages	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   long	   tradition	   in	   the	   economics	   literature	   that	   recognizes	  macroeconomic	   performance	   should	   be	   enhanced	   by	   having	   a	   fixed	   exchange	  rate.	  Perhaps	  the	  main	  perceived	  advantage	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  and	  the	  one	  that	  is	  emphasized	  most	  in	  the	  recent	  exchange	  rate	  literature,	  is	  that	  it	  prevents	  a	   country	   that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  a	  profligate	  monetary	  policy	  pursuing	  an	  independent	  monetary	  policy.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	  allows	  the	  country	  to	  buy	   into	  the	  monetary	  credibility	  of	  the	  country	  it	  is	  pegging	  to.	  Indeed,	  if	  a	  central	  bank	  puts	   a	   premium	   on	   fighting	   inflation	   it	   may	   find	   it	   advantageous	   to	   peg	   its	  exchange	  rate	  to	  a	  hard	  currency	  with	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐inflationary	  reputation	  (for	  example,	  the	  DM	  was	  seen	  in	  this	  light	  for	  much	  of	  the	  post	  war	  Bretton	  Woods	  period)	  and	  so	   ‘import’	   the	  credibility	  and	   low	   inflation	  environment.	  The	   idea	  being	   that	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   credible	   peg,	   workers	   and	   managers	   will	   set	  wages	  and	  prices	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   an	  expected	   low	   inflation	  environment	   in	   the	  future	  (because	  the	  currency	  peg	  prevents	  the	  central	  bank	  from	  expanding	  the	  money	  supply,	  especially	  if	  it	  is	  an	  irrevocable	  peg),	  thereby	  allowing	  the	  country	  to	  attain	  a	   lower	   inflation	  rate	   for	  any	  given	   level	  of	  output.	   In	   this	  context	   the	  harder	  the	  peg	  the	  more	  effective	  it	  is	  seen	  in	  enhancing	  credibility.	  	  As	   the	   IMF	  has	  made	   clear	   in	   a	  number	  of	   its	  Article	   IV	  documents,	   the	  issues	  of	  a	  credible	  peg,	  along	  with	  the	  familiarity	  argument,	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  one	  of	   the	  key	   arguments	   as	   to	  why	   certain	  Gulf	   countries	  have	   chosen	   to	  peg	  their	   currencies	   to	   the	   US	   dollar	   for	   long	   periods	   of	   time.	   The	   Scottish	  Government’s	  Fiscal	  Commission	  report	  suggests	  it	  is	  this	  credibility	  aspect	  that	  
is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  arguments	  behind	  the	  Scottish	  governments	  decisions	  to	  opt	  for	  being	  part	  of	  the	  sterling	  zone	  monetary	  union.	  	  However,	  pegging	  the	  exchange	  rate	  to	  a	  currency	  which	  is	  inappropriate,	  and	  one	  which	  pursues	  monetary	  policies	  which	  do	  not	  meet	  domestic	  needs,	  is	  clearly	   a	   recipe	   for	   potential	   disaster	   for	   the	   home	   country’s	   monetary	   and	  exchange	   rate	   policy.	   Also,	   such	   a	   peg	   is	   of	   limited	   usefulness	  when	   the	   home	  country	  needs	  to	  pursue	  a	  monetary	  policy	  that	  is	  at	  variance	  with	  that	  pursued	  in	   the	   foreign	   country.	   For	   Scotland	   this,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   may	   occur	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  asymmetric	  shocks	  that	  affect	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  differently	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  (RUK),	  or	  symmetric	  shocks	  that	  are	  transmitted	  differently	  to	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  because	  of	  the	  underlying	  economic/	  industrial	  structure.	  	   A	  second	  supposed	  advantage	  of	   fixed	  rates	   is	  that	  when	  exchange	  rates	  are	   flexible	   they	   are	   highly	   volatile	   and	   such	   volatility	   can	   impart	   uncertainty	  into	   trade	   and	   investment	   decisions,	   thereby	   having	   a	   negative	   influence	   on	   a	  country’s	   international	   trade	   and	   investment.	   Removing	   this	   source	   of	  uncertainty	  should	  therefore	  encourage	  international	  trade	  and	  investment	  and	  again	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  key	  plank	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Governments	  decision	  to	  adopt	  sterling	   as	   its	   preferred	   currency.	   However,	   an	   alternative	   response	   to	   this	  argument	  is	  to	  say	  that	  trade	  and	  investment	  should	  be	  unaffected	  by	  exchange	  rate	  volatility	  since	  agents	  can	  hedge	  the	  exchange	  rate	  volatility	   in	   the	   foreign	  exchange	  market.	  Forward	  markets,	  though,	  are	  notoriously	  incomplete	  –	  being	  non-­‐existent	   for	   some	   developing	   countries	   and	   only	   existing	   at	   very	   limited	  maturities	   for	   all	   countries.	   Initially,	   empirical	   studies	   failed	   to	   reveal	   a	   link	  between	   exchange	   rate	   volatility	   on	   trade	   and	   investment,	   but	   more	   recent	  estimates	  do	  in	  fact	  show	  an	  important	  link	  (see	  for	  example	  MacDonald,	  2007).	  
Given	  that	  Scotland	  has	  a	  diversified	  industrial	  and	  service	  structure	  this	  points	  suggests	  that	  it	  would	  unlikely	  be	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  to	  move	  to	  a	  purely	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  (i.e.	  the	  top	  left	  corner	  of	  Table	  1).	  	  	   Related	  to	  the	  trade	  and	  investment	  effects	  of	  exchange	  rate	  volatility,	   is	  the	  issue	  of	  exchange	  rate	  misalignment	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  international	  trade	  and	  investment.	  Misalignment	  occurs	  because	  exchange	  rates	  when	  they	  are	  flexible	  can	  often	   spend	   long	  periods	  away	   from	   their	   fundamentals-­‐based	  equilibrium	  due	  to	  purely	  speculative	  influences.	  For	  example,	  the	  long	  swings	  in	  the	  dollar	  in	  the	  1980’s	  –	   its	   appreciation	  down	   to	  1985	  and	   the	   subsequent	  depreciation	  –	  are	   generally	   regarded	   as	   being	   driven	   by	   speculative	   factors.	   By	   fixing	   an	  exchange	  rate,	  such	  misalignments	  may	  be	  removed	  and	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  on	   trade	   and	   investment	   also	   removed,	   assuming	   a	   country	   locks	   its	   exchange	  rate	  at	  the	  correct	  rate	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  However,	  even	  if	  a	  peg	  is	  locked	  in	  at	  the	  correct	   rate	   to	   start	  with,	   relative	   (unfavourable)	   price	  movements	   away	   from	  the	   starting	  point	   can	  generate	  misalignment	  over	   time	  and	   this	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  particularly	  so	  if	  Scotland	  suffered	  asymmetric	  shocks	  relative	  to	  RUK.	  	  The	   above	   two	   points	   have	   a	   particular	   resonance	   for	   a	   hydrocarbon	  exporting	   country	   and	   they	   can	   be	   bundled	   into	   the	   ‘Dutch	   disease	   case’	   for	  pegging	   to	   the	   dollar.	   For	   a	   commodity	   exporter	   considering	   floating	   its	  currency,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  that	  is	  potentially	  volatile	  -­‐	  the	  price	  of	  its	  commodity	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  volatile.	  For	  an	  oil	  producer,	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  is	  volatile	  and	  its	  currency	  would	  generally	  be	  expected	  to	  appreciate	  when	  the	  price	  of	  oil	   is	  high,	  but	  this	  would	  imply	  an	  exchange	  rate	  misalignment	  for	  its	   non-­‐oil	   sector	   that	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   desirable.	   By	   pegging	   to	   the	   dollar	   the	  country,	   in	   principle,	   avoids	   the	   consequences	   of	   Dutch	   disease	   for	   its	   non-­‐oil	  
sector.	  But	  the	  Dutch	  disease	  phenomenon	  is	  really	  about	  an	  inappropriate	  fiscal	  policy	   –	   i.e.	   it	   is	   the	   spending	   from	   oil	   that	   creates	   the	   Dutch	   disease	  phenomenon	  and	  so,	  if	  like	  Norway,	  you	  only	  spend	  the	  income	  stream	  from	  the	  oil	   fund	   you	  will	   only	  have	   a	   limited	   effect	   on	   the	   real	   exchange	   rate.3	  Also,	   in	  fixing	  to	  Sterling	  when	  the	  price	  of	  oil	   is	   low	  could	  also	  be	  equally	  damaging	  to	  the	   oil	   producer.	   For	   example,	   if	   sterling	   appreciates	   this	   will	   appreciate	   the	  home	   currency	   against	   its	   other	   trading	   partners,	   further	   exacerbating	   the	  deflationary	  consequences	  of	  the	  low	  price	  of	  oil.	  	  	   A	   further	   perceived	   advantage	   of	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   is	   in	   preventing	  competitive,	  or	  beggar-­‐thy-­‐neighbour,	  devaluations.	   	  Looking	  back	  at	   the	   inter-­‐war	   experience	  of	   exchange	   rate	   flexibility,	   this	  was	  one	  of	   the	   key	  motivating	  factors	  for	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  who	  saw	  a	  system	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  as	  a	  means	  of	  obtaining	  a	  cooperative	  solution	  to	  the	  competitive	  devaluation	   issue.	  As	  Frankel	  (2003)	  points	  out,	  a	  recent	  update	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  argument	   is	   seen	   in	   the	   currency	   crises	   and	   contagion	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	  1990s,	  where	   devaluation	   in	   one	   country	   immediately	   spread	   to	   neighbouring	  countries	  because	  they	  felt	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage,	  but	  ultimately	  they	  did	  not	   gain	   from	   this.	   Again	   this	   may	   be	   an	   important	   issue	   for	   Scotland	   in	   the	  context	  of	  its	  relations	  with	  its	  near	  neighbour,	  RUK.	  	  	  	   To	   sum	   up,	   how	  would	   fixing	   the	   Scottish	   exchange	   rate	   to	   RUK	   in	   the	  form	   a	   monetary	   union	   impact	   on	   an	   independent	   Scotland?	   Fixing	   of	   the	  exchange	  rate,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  being	  a	  part	  of	  the	  sterling	  monetary	  union,	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  have	  conferred	  on	  the	  country	  a	  credible	  and	  familiar	  nominal	  anchor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Additionally though there are wealth effects on private sector consumption and the separate effect of 
investment in the oil industry both of which are likely to the impacted by changes in the price of oil 
and	  to	  have	  reduced	  the	  deleterious	  consequences	  of	  exchange	  rate	  volatility	  on	  trade	  and	  investment	  (although	  sterling	  itself	  is	  a	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  eliminated	  in	  terms	  of	  non	  RUK	  trade).	  However,	  to	  set	  against	  this	  the	  continuation	   of	   such	   a	   policy	   in	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   would	   imply	   that	  Scotland	  would	  be	  facing	  the	  well	  known	  Trilemma,	  or	  incompatibility	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  high	  capital	  mobility	  and	  an	  independent	  monetary	  policy.	  Since	  the	   one	   sized	   fits	   all	  monetary	   policy	   of	   the	  Bank	   of	   England	  has	   inevitably	   to	  give	  most	  weight	  to	  the	  economic	  heartland	  of	  the	  UK	  -­‐	  the	  South	  East	  of	  England	  (just	  as	  the	  ECB	  has	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  economic	  heartland	  of	  Europe)	  -­‐	  it	  is	  unlikely	  this	  would	  be	  appropriate	   for	  an	   independent	  Scotland,	  even	  with	  some	  voting	  power	   on	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   monetary	   Committee,	   and	   this	   would	   seem	   to	  apply	   a	   fortiori	   once	   the	   effects	   of	   North	   Sea	   Oil	   on	   the	   real	   and	   nominal	  exchange	   rate	   are	   recognized.	   Furthermore,	   since	   the	   kind	  of	   peg	  proposed	  by	  the	  Scottish	  government	  cannot	  be	  irrevocable	  (since	  there	  would	  by	  definition	  be	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  political	  union	  with	  independence)	  it	  would	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  credible	  peg	  by	  the	  markets,	  for	  the	  reasons	  noted	  above.	  	  	  	  
5.2	  The	  advantages	  of	  a	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  The	   original,	   traditional,	   case	   for	   flexible	   exchange	   rates	   was	   made	   by	  Milton	  Friedman	  in	  his	  classic	  1953	  essay	  ‘The	  Case	  for	  Flexible	  Exchange	  Rates’	  and	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   strands	   to	   this	   case.	   The	   existence	   of	   a	   flexible	  exchange	  rate	  breaks	  the	  well-­‐known	  trilemma,	  referred	  to	  above,	  and	  allows	  a	  country	  to	  have	  an	  independent	  monetary	  even	  if	  capital	  is	  perfectly	  mobile.	  This	  could	   have	   clear	   advantages	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   in	   any	   attempt	   to	  control	   inflationary/	   deflationary	   pressures	   that	  were	   different	   from	   RUK	   and	  
other	   trading	   partners	   and	   from	   inflationary	   shocks	   driven	   by	   NSO	   shocks.	   It	  would	   also	   mean	   that	   fiscal	   policy	   in	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   would	   not	   be	  subject	  to	  the	  constraints	  that	  it	  would	  face	  in	  a	  sterling	  monetary	  union.	  	  	  	   Second,	   a	   fixed	   rate	   system	   fails	   to	   provide	   a	   country	  with	   an	   effective	  adjustment	  mechanism	  for	  its	  balance	  of	  payments,	  whereas	  a	  flexible	  rate	  offers	  an	   automatic	   adjustment	   mechanism;	   i.e.	   fluctuations	   in	   a	   country’s	   terms	   of	  trade,	  particularly	  adverse	  movements,	  are	  automatically	  reflected	  in	  a	  country’s	  currency	  movement.	   This	   argument	   is	   seen	   as	   of	   special	   importance	   for	   a	   net	  hydrocarbon	  exporter	  since	   it	  means	   that	  as	   the	  price	  of	  oil	   rises,	   the	  currency	  will	  appreciate	  and	  as	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  falls	  the	  currency	  can	  depreciate.	  In	  other	  words,	   as	   the	   terms	   of	   trade	   changes	   the	   currency	   moves	   in	   the	   appropriate	  direction.	  This	  stabilising	  role	  of	  a	   floating	  rate	  system	   is	  often	   taken	   to	  be	   the	  key	  element	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  (see	  Machlup	  (1972)),	  although,	  of	  course,	  such	  movements	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  satisfactory	  for	  a	  country,	  such	  as	  Scotland,	  that	  has	  a	  diversified	  non-­‐oil	  sector.	  The	  third	  supposed	  advantage	  of	  a	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  insulating	   properties	   with	   respect	   to	   real	   shocks	   that	   show	   up	   in	   the	   form	   of	  trade	  shocks.	  For	  example,	  a	  fall	  in	  demand	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  for	  the	  home	  country’s	   exports	   would	   automatically	   be	   countered	   by	   an	   exchange	   rate	  depreciation	   and	   a	   fall	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   trade	   which	   produces	   an	   offsetting	  stimulus	  to	  demand.	  	  However,	  to	  set	  against	  the	  last	  two	  points,	  others	  have	  argued	  that	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  stabilising	  influence	  and	  an	  absorber	  of	  shocks	  a	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	   can	   have	   the	   opposite	   effect	   and	   itself	   be	   a	   source	   of	   shocks	   (see,	   for	  example,	  Artis	   and	  Ehrmann	   (2006)).	  On	   this	  point	  we	  would	   subscribe	   to	   the	  
Firedmanite	  view	  that	  an	  unstable	  flexible	  exchange	  rates	  are	  caused	  by	  unstable	  underlying	  macroeconomic	  policies	  and	  the	  Norwegian	  experience	  shows	  how	  a	  resource	  dependent	  small	  open	  economy	  can	  handle	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility.	  	   	  A	   fourth	   advantage	   of	   a	   flexible	   rate	   system	   is	   that	   it	   allows	   a	   central	  bank	   to	   maintain	   two	   potentially	   important	   advantages	   of	   an	   independent	  central	  bank,	  namely	  it	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  any	  seigniorage	  and	  act	  as	  a	  lender-­‐of-­‐last	  resort.	  The	  latter	  may	  be	  important	  in	  a	  banking	  crises	  where	  the	  ability	  of	   the	  central	  bank	  to	  create	  unlimited	  funds	   is	   likely	  to	  be	   important	   in	  baling	  out	  banks	  although	  as	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  scale	  of	  Scottish	  banks	  may	  be	  so	  large	  that	   even	   an	   independent	   Scottish	  Central	   bank	  would	  be	  unable	   to	   bale	   them	  out.	   	   The	   former	   advantage	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   ‘small	   beer’	   since	   as	   Buiter	   (2000)	  notes	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   UK	   potentially	   giving	   up	   monetary	   control	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   Euro,	   the	   loss	   of	   seigniorage	   would	   only	   been	   .24%	   of	   GDP	  since	  1994	  	   A	  fifth	  advantage	  of	  a	  floating	  rate	  system	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  let	  a	  country,	   and	  more	   generally	   the	  world	   economy,	   function	  without	   recourse	   to	  trade	   barriers	   and	   tariffs,	   the	   idea	   being	   that	   if	   the	   exchange	   rate	   is	   free	   to	  equilibriate	  a	  country’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  the	  need	  for	  protectionist	  devices	  –	  such	  as	  tariffs	  and	  quotas	  –	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  limited.	  	  A	   sixth	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   flexible	   exchange	   rates	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  need	   to	   hold	   foreign	   exchange	   reserves.	   In	   principle	   with	   a	   floating	   exchange	  rate,	   the	   change	   in	   official	   reserves	   is	   zero.	   Since	   reserves	   earn	   a	   zero,	   or	   low,	  return	   compared	   to	   a	   longer-­‐term	   investment	   there	   would	   be	   some,	   perhaps	  small,	  savings	  for	  the	  national	  economy	  (a	  central	  bank	  would	  still	  hold	  reserves	  in	  a	  free	  float	  to	  pay	  for	  official	  commercial	  transactions).	  	  
	   To	  sum	  up	  the	  discussion	  here,	  the	  main	  advantage	  for	  a	  country	  which	  is	  an	   important	   commodity	  producer,	   of	  having	  a	   flexible	   exchange	   rate	   is	   that	   it	  would	   allow	   the	   key	   element	   of	   providing	   a	   rapid	   exchange	   rate	   appreciation	  (both	   real	   and	   nominal)	   when	   the	   price	   of	   the	   commodity	   (oil)	   rises	   and	   an	  appropriate	  depreciation	  when	  the	  price	  of	  the	  commodity	  falls.	  Although	  a	  fixed	  rate	  system	  can	  provide	  the	  real	  aspects	  of	  such	  appreciation,	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	   the	  process	   is	   likely	  to	  be	   long	  drawn	  out	  and	   indeed	  this	  can	  create	   its	  own	   problems	   and	   tensions.	   Some	   flexibility	   would	   also	   be	   good	   for	  misalignment	   reasons,	   and	   to	   stave	   off	   potential	   future	  misalignments,	   and	   to	  help	  in	  tackling	  the	  inflationary	  process.	  A	  flexible	  exchange	  rate	  address	  the	  so-­‐	  called	  trilemma	  and	  allows	  a	  country	  to	  pursue	  an	  independent	  monetary	  policy	  and	   an	   independent	   fiscal	   policy,	   both	   of	   which	   are	   precluded	   in	   a	   monetary	  union.	  Some	  for	  of	  flexible	  rate	  for	  the	  Scottish	  pound	  would	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  credible	  exchange	  rate	  arrangement	  by	  financial	  markets	  	  The	  down	  side,	  of	  course,	   in	  moving	  to	  a	  more	   flexible	  exchange	  rate	  regime	   is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  stable	  nominal	  anchor	  component	  pegging	  to	  another	  currency	  that	   would	  most	   likely	   be	   lost.	   	   This	   is	   something	   we	   consider	   again	   in	  more	  detail	  below	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  various	  monetary	  and	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  options	   available.	  Additionally,	   care	  would	  have	   to	   be	   taken	   in	   recognising	   the	  needs	   of	   the	   non-­‐oil	   sector	   in	   designing	   the	   appropriate	   exchange	   rate	   regime	  and	  this	  is	  something	  we	  also	  return	  to	  later	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  So	  what	  kind	  of	  exchange	   rate	   flexibility	   could	   work	   for	   a	   separate	   Scots	   pound?	   In	   the	   next	  section	  we	   consider	  what	   these	  might	   look	   like,	   along	  with	   a	  discussion	  of	   the	  
kind	  of	  fixed	  rate	  options	  that	  have	  been	  discussed	  elsewhere	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Kay	  (2013)).	  	  
	  
6.	  Alternative	  exchange	  rate	  regimes	  options.	  	  In	   this	  section	  we	  expand	  on	  our	  previous	  discussions	  to	  consider	  a	  number	  of	  potential	   exchange	   rate	   regimes	   that	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   could	   consider,	  ranging	  form	  pegging	  to	  the	  pound	  sterling	  pegging	  to	  a	  basket	  of	  currencies	  that	  could	  have	  some	  flexibility.	  	  
A	   fixed,	   or	   pegged,	   exchange	   rate	   (unilateral	   option).	   Instead	   of	  continuing	   in	   a	   full-­‐blown	   monetary	   union	   with	   RUK,	   Scotland	   could	   simply	  choose	   to	  peg	   its	   exchange	   rate	   to	   the	  pound	   sterling.	  The	  main	   advantages	  of	  such	  a	  regime	  are	  that	   it	  offers	  potential	  exchange	  rate	  stability,	  credibility	  and	  familiarity.	   Indeed,	   Denmark,	   a	   country	   of	   similar	   size	   to	   an	   independent	  Scotland,	   has,	   despite	   refusing	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   European	   Stability	   Fund,	  successfully	  pegged	  its	  exchange	  rate	  (at	  a	  rate	  of	  7.5	  Danish	  krone)	  to	  the	  euro	  since	   its	   inception.	  A	  somewhat	  different	  non-­‐European	  currency	  peg	   is	   that	  of	  the	   Hong	   Kong	   dollar	   which	   has	   successfully	   pegged	   its	   currency	   to	   the	   USD	  since	  1983.	  Of	  course	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  pegging,	  as	  we	  have	  noted	  above,	  is	  that	  a	  country	  foregoes	  having	  an	  independent	  monetary	  policy.	  That	  is	  clear	  for	  example	  in	  the	  Danish	  case	  where	  refusal	  to	  be	  a	  full	  member	  of	  the	  eurozone	  means	   that	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   influence	   decision	   taking	   on	   the	   European	   Central	  Bank.	  However,	   to	  set	  against	  this	  given	  the	  Danish	  economy	  represents	  a	  very	  small	   proportion	   of	   the	   overall	   European	   economy	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   it	   would	  have	  much	  influence	  over	  the	  setting	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  the	  Euro	  area	  even	  if	  it	  were	  a	  member.	  	  
Another	  interesting	  set	  of	  examples	  of	  currency	  unilaterally	  pegging	  their	  currencies	  to	  another	  currency	  is	  that	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Gulf	  state	  countries	  who	  have	   chosen	   to	  peg	   their	   currencies	   to	   the	  USD	   for	   a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  time	  and	  have	  thereby	  been	  able	  to	  buy	  make	  their	  own	  currencies	  credible	  by	  association	   with	   the	   dollar.	   However	   there	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	   periods	   of	  extreme	   tension	  when	  some	  of	   the	   countries	  were	  considering	  abandoning	   the	  peg	   (Kuwait	   in	   fact	   abandoned	   its	   USD	   peg	   in	   2007)	   because	   of	   its	  inappropriateness	   for	   domestic	   monetary	   policy	   on	   a	   number	   of	   occasions.	  Indeed	  one	  of	   the	   reasons	   the	  pegs	  described	   for	  Hong	  Kong	  and	   for	  Denmark	  has	  been	  successful	   is	  that	  the	  countries	   in	  question	  and	  the	  countries	  they	  are	  pegging	   their	   currencies	   to	   are	   all	   net	   importers	   of	   oil	   and	   therefore	   resource	  shocks	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  similar	  impact	  across	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  As	  we	  noted	  in	  our	  discussions	  of	  the	  optimum	  currency	  area	  criteria,	  oil	  exporters	  and	  oil	   importers	  generally	  need	  different	  macroeconomic	  policies:	  a	  permanent	   shock	   to	   the	   price	   of	   oil	   requires	   a	   different	   adjustment	   in	   the	   oil	  exporting	  and	  oil	   importing	  country.	  For	  example,	  a	  permanent	   increase	   in	   the	  price	   of	   oil	   requires	   reduced	   levels	   of	   consumption	   and	   investment	   in	   the	   oil	  importing	  country	  and	  a	  real	  depreciation	  of	  its	  currency,	  whereas	  the	  opposite	  should	  be	  happening	  in	  the	  oil	  exporting	  country:	  higher	   levels	  of	  consumption	  and	  investment	  and	  a	  real	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation.	  The	  ball-­‐park	  figure	  for	  an	  oil	  exporter	  is	  that	  a	  100	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  should	  generate	  a	  currency	  appreciation	  of	  50	  per	  cent.	  	  With	  a	   fixed	  exchange	   rate,	   clearly	  all	  of	   the	   inflation	  adjustment	   comes	  from	  changes	   in	   the	  price	   level.	  This	  process	   is	   slower	   than	   it	   should	  be	  and	   it	  can	  often	  still	  be	  working	  its	  way	  through	  the	  economic	  system	  after	  the	  oil	  price	  
has	   stabilised.	   Furthermore,	   this	   process	   can	   create	   inflationary	   expectations	  which	  gives	  the	  inflationary	  process	  its	  own	  momentum	  and	  will	  probably	  push	  up	   the	   real	   exchange	   rate	   even	   after	   oil	   prices	   have	   turned	   down,	   implying	   a	  misalignment	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	   real	   overvaluation.	   The	   inflationary	   process	   can	  lead	  to	  dramatic	  swings	   in	   the	  real	   interest	  rate	   -­‐	   in	   the	   inflationary	  boom	  real	  rates	  become	  zero	  or	  negative,	  further	  boosting	  the	  inflationary	  process.	  Equally,	  a	   fall	   in	   the	   price	   of	   oil	   needs	   a	   fall	   in	   domestic	   prices	   and	   this	   can	   produce	   a	  similar	   set	  of	  problems	   to	   the	   inflationary	  environment	  with	   the	  process	  being	  long	  drawn	  out,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  the	   inflationary	  case,	  given	  the	  common	  consensus	   that	   there	   is	   an	   important	   asymmetry	   between	   rises	   and	   falls	   in	  prices.	  A	  further	  twist	  is	  introduced	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  pegged	  regime	  since	  sterling	   and	   the	   US	   dollar	   are	   themselves	   flexible	   currencies.	   If	   the	   pegging	  currency	  has	  significant	  trade	  relations	  with	  countries	  other	  than	  the	  sterling	  or	  US	  areas	   then	  the	  capricious	  changes	   in	   the	  pegged	  currency	  could	  well	  have	  a	  deleterious	   effect	   on	   Scotland’s	   trade	   since	   it	  will	   import	   the	   implied	   volatility	  from	  third	  country	  trading	  partners.	  	  For	   the	   Gulf	   countries,	   for	   example,	   they	   have	   faced	   long	   swings	   of	  depreciation	   and	   appreciation	   of	   the	   USD	   –	   mid	   1980s,	   late	   1990s	   and	   mid	  noughties	  –	  completely	  unconnected	  with	  the	  pegging	  country’s	  currency.	  These	  kinds	  of	  movements	  can	  have	  a	  dramatic	  an	  unpleasant	  side	  effect	  on	  the	  non-­‐oil	  sector	  of	  a	  diversified	  economy.	  	  
An	  alternative	  anchor	  /	  numeraire.	  Instead	  of	  sticking	  with	  the	  pound	  sterling	  fix,	  Scotland	  could	  peg	  to	  an	  alternative	  numeraire	  currency,	  such	  as	  the	  euro.	  There	  are	  however	  a	  number	  of	  pitfalls	   in	  such	  a	  strategy.	  First,	  since	  the	  
euro	  zone	   is	  a	  net	  oil-­‐importing	   region,	   in	  pegging	   to	   the	  euro,	  Scotland	  would	  suffer	  from	  similar	  problems	  to	  pegging	  to	  the	  US	  dollar,	  noted	  above.	  Second,	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  unlikely	  satisfy	  the	  so-­‐called	  Maatsricht	  criteria	  for	  membership	   since	   its	   budget	   deficit	   and	   debt	   ratio	   would	   be	   above	   those	  necessary	   for	   membership	   of	   the	   eurozone.	   Third,	   given	   the	   majority	   of	  Scotland‘s	  trade	  is	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  it	  would	  not	  make	  sense	  for	  Scotland	  to	  lock	  its	  currency	  to	  the	  euro.	  Fourth,	  the	  euro	  zone	  is	  a	  much	  bigger	  one-­‐size	  fits	  all	  monetary	  policy	  area	  than	  the	  sterling	  zone	  and	  it	  is	  now	  clear	  that	  the	  Irish	  decision	   to	  move	   from	  a	   relationship	  with	  sterling	  was	  not	  a	   sensible	  decision,	  nor	   would	   it	   be	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland.	   Finally,	   the	   euro	   area	   is	   a	   net	  importer	   of	   oil	   and	   therefore	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   arguments	   noted	   above	   with	  respect	  to	  a	  sterling	  union	  would	  apply	  here.	  
A	   basket	   peg	   may	   be	   a	   useful	   alternative	   to	   pegging	   against	   a	   single	  currency.	   For	   Scotland	   one	   key	   advantage	   of	   this	   would	   be	   in	   constructing	   a	  basket	   which	   better	   reflected	   its	   trade	   overall	   trading	   patterns,	   in	   addition	   to	  those	  with	   RUK;	   i.e.	  with	   the	   euro	   area	   and	  Asia.	   In	   principle,	   by	   pegging	   to	   a	  basket	   of	   currencies	   a	   country	   should	   be	   able	   to	   gain	   the	   nominal	   anchor	  advantages	  of	   a	   straight	   fixed	  peg,	  discussed	  above.	   In	  practice,	   though,	  basket	  pegs	  seem	  to	  be	   less	  credible	   than	  a	  peg	  to	  a	  single	  currency	  and	  this	  could	  be	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   the	   basket	   itself	   is	   not	   traded	   and	   it	   is	   difficult	   for	   market	  participants	   to	   infer	   the	   true	  credibility	  of	   the	  currency.	  Nonetheless,	   there	  are	  some	  successful	  example	  of	  such	  pegs	  including	  the	  Kuwaiti	  dinar	  and	  Thai	  bat	  Rather	   than	   fixing	   to	   a	   basket,	   a	   crawling	   peg	   of	   the	   basket	   is	   a	  possibility	  where	  the	  peg	  is	  allowed	  to	  change,	  usually	  to	  accommodate	  inflation	  –	   an	   indexed	   crawl	   –	   or	   is	   a	  preannounced	   crawl	   to	  maintain	   competitiveness.	  
For	   an	   independent	   Scotland,	   the	   crawl	   could	   be	   linked	   to	   the	   price	   of	   oil	   to	  ensure	   the	   requisite	   adjustment	   takes	   place	   as	   the	   price	   of	   oil	   changes.	   An	  appropriate	   designed	   crawl	   could	   therefore	   allow	   Scotland	   to	   have	   a	   more	  appropriate	   monetary	   policy	   and,	   crucially,	   it	   would	   play	   the	   key	   role	   of	  providing	   appropriate	   real	   exchange	   rate	   changes	   in	   response	   to	   permanent	  changes	  in	  the	  price	  of	  oil.	  Since	  the	  peg	  would	  not	  be	  changing	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  it	  would	   still	   provide	   the	   stability	   and	   credibility	   of	   a	   sterling	   peg,	   but	   of	   course	  without	   the	   very	   evident	   disadvantages	   such	   a	   peg.	   Our	   proposal	   could	   be	  viewed	   as	   a	  more	   sophisticated	   variant	   of	   a	  managed	   float,	  which	   has	   in	   fact	  been	   the	   preferred	   option	   of	   many	   oil	   producers.	   For	   example,	   Canada	   and	  Norway	   have	   deliberately	   not	   joined	  monetary	   unions	  with	   their	   close	   trading	  partners	   because	   of	   their	   large	   oil	   exports.	   Brazil	   and	   South	   Africa	   also	   have	  substantially	  more	  flexibility	  of	  their	  currencies	  than	  is	  the	  norm	  in	  oil	  exporters	  and	  these	  regimes	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  successful	  (although	  admittedly	  they	  do	  intervene	  quite	  frequently	  in	  their	  foreign	  exchange	  markets)	  	  	  	  	  
Peg	  the	  export	  price.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  variant	  of	  inflation	  targeting,	  only	   now	   the	   price	   pegged	   in	   terms	   of	   domestic	   currency	   (or	   set	   the	   value	   of	  domestic	   currency	   in	   terms	   of	   that	   commodity)	   is	   the	   export	   price	   (Frankel	  (2003).	  PEP	  is	  seen	  of	  most	   interest	   to	  countries	  that	  are	  heavily	  specialised	   in	  the	   production	   of	   a	   particular	   mineral	   or	   agricultural	   export	   commodity.	   The	  rule	  under	  this	  proposal	  is	  that	  oil-­‐producing	  countries	  would	  peg	  their	  currency	  to	  oil,	   gold	  producers	   to	   gold	   and	   coffee	  producers	   to	   coffee	   etc.	  This	   could	  be	  implemented	  operationally	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways.	  First,	  the	  government	  could	  hold	  reserves	  of	  oil	  and	  intervene	  whenever	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  price	  fixed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  local	  currency.	  Or,	  alternatively,	  the	  central	  bank	  could	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐
day	  basis	  announce	  an	  exchange	  rate	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  dollar	  and	  during	  the	  day	  ensure	  that	  rate	  moves	  precisely	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  days	  price	  of	  oil.	  	  However,	   this	   raises	   the	  key	  disadvantage	  of	   this	  approach,	  namely	   that	  by	  pegging	  directly	   to	   the	  price	  of	  oil	  would	  result	   in	  volatility	  of	   the	  exchange	  rate	  as	   it	   swings	   in	   line	  with	   the	  volatile	  underlying	  asset	   (like	  a	  derivative).	   If	  the	  non-­‐oil	  sector	  is	  important	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  the	   PEP	   policy	   could	   potentially	   destabilise	   the	   local	   currency	   price	   of	   other	  goods	  and	  services,	  which	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  Dutch	  disease.	  So	  for	  such	  countries	  may	  need	  a	  modified	  version	  PEP.	  Potential	   alternatives	  would	  be	   to	  define	  a	  band	  around	  the	  central	  parity,	  much	  as	  in	  a	  crawling	  peg,	  or	  to	  move	  to	  a	  basket	  which	  includes	  the	  price	  of	  oil.	  	  
Pegging	  to	  a	  Basket	  and	  the	  price	  of	  oil.	  An	  alternative	  to	  pegging	  to	  a	  either	  a	  basket	  of	  currencies	  or	  simply	  to	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  is	  to	  define	  as	  the	  parity	  the	  basket	  that	  includes	  the	  export	  commodity	  as	  well	  as	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  currencies	  of	  major	  trading	  partners.	  	  A	   key	   advantage	   of	   this	   variant	   of	   PEP,	   which	   we	   label	   PBO,	   is	   that	   it	  delivers	  one	  of	  the	  main	  advantages	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate,	  namely	  the	  nominal	  anchor	  function	  through	  pegging	  to	  the	  basket	  of	  currencies,	  plus	  one	  of	  the	  main	  advantages	   of	   a	   floating	   rate	   regime,	   automatic	   adjustment	   in	   the	   face	   of	  fluctuations	   in	   the	   prices	   of	   the	   countries’	   exports	   on	  world	  markets:	   under	   a	  PBO	   system	  when	   the	   dollar	   price	   of	   oil	   rises	   (falls)	   the	   currency	   appreciates	  (depreciates).	   Such	   accommodation	  of	   terms	  of	   trade	   shocks	   is	   exactly	  what	   is	  required	   and	   this	   is	   why	   this	   variant	   of	   the	   PEP	   is	   regarded	   as	   so	   attractive	  relative	  to	  conventional	  (CPI)	  targeting	  which	  would	  not	  react	  to	  movements	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  trade	  (more	  on).	  For	  instance,	  the	  terms	  of	  trade	  criterion	  suggests	  
that	   a	   rise	   in	   the	   import	   price	   should	   be	   addressed	   by	   a	   local	   currency	  depreciation	   and	   although	   neither	   the	   PBO	   or	   CPI	   targeting	   regimes	   would	  deliver	   on	   that,	   the	   CPI	   inflation	   targeting	   regime	   would	   actually	   produce	   a	  tightening	   of	   monetary	   policy	   (because	   of	   the	   inflationary	   implications)	   and	  therefore	  an	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation.	  This	  kind	  of	  policy	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  exacerbate	  swings	  in	  the	  trade	  balance	  and	  output.	  	  
Fixing	  the	  currency	  to	  the	  price	  of	  a	  unit	  of	  gold	  has	  historically	  been	  popular	   and	   has	   been	   popularised	   recently	   by	   Robert	   Mundell	   and	   Richard	  Cooper	   amongst	   others.	   Many	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   so-­‐called	   Classical	   gold	  standard	  worked	  well	  and	  conferred	  on	  countries	  the	  credibility	  which	  seems	  to	  be	   so	   lacking	   on	   a	   fiat	   based	   system	   (see	   Bordo	   and	  MacDonald	   (2009)).	   The	  Gold	  standard	  system,	  which	   is	  often	   taken	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	   fixed	  rates	  par	  excellence,	  worked	  both	  because	  it	  offered	  a	  country	  an	  escape	  clause	  in	  times	  of	  crises	   (a	   currency	   could	   suspend	   its	   participation	   in	   the	   gold	   standard	   for	   a	  limited	   period	   of	   time	   to	   deal	   with	   a	   crises	   as	   long	   as	   it	   was	   committed	   to	  returning	  at	   the	  previous	  parity).	  Additionally	  as	  Bordo	  and	  MacDonald	  (2005)	  have	  demonstrated	   the	   existence	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	   gold	  points	   imparted	   enough	  flexibility	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  to	  allow	  participating	  countries	  some	  flexibility	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  their	  monetary	  policy.	  	  	  	  However,	  the	  key	  problem	  with	  the	  gold	  standard	  type	  of	  arrangement	  is	  that	  it	  was	  and	  is	  crucially	  dependent	  on	  the	  world	  gold	  market	  and	  specifically	  the	  production	  of	  gold.	  For	  example,	   in	  the	  period	  1873	  to	  1896,	  countries	  had	  linked	   their	  money	  supplies	  and	  exchange	  rates	   to	   the	  price	  of	  gold	  had	   falling	  prices	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   major	   discoveries	   of	   gold	   during	   this	   period.	   In	  contrast,	  the	  major	  gold	  rushes	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  (California,	  1849,	  and	  
Alaska	   and	   South	   Africa	   in	   the	   late	   1890s)	   led	   to	   increases	   in	   liquidity	   with	  resulting	   inflationary	   pressures.	   However,	   although	   we	   do	   not	   believe	  participating	  in	  a	  Gold	  standard	  arrangement	  is	  appropriate	  for	  countries	  today	  we	  do	  believe	  there	  are	  important	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  the	  gold	  standard	  episodes,	  namely	   that	  even	   in	  a	   regime	  of	   fixed	  exchange	  rates	   there	  has	   to	  be	  some	  form	  of	  credible	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  function	  efficiently.	  
	  
7.	  Concluding	  Comments	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  taken	  on	  the	  role	  of	  a	  virtual	  consultant	  to	  a	  potentially	  independent	  Scotland.	  What	  should	  the	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  look	  like?	  We	  note	  that	  the	  current	  proposal	  of	  the	  Scottish	  government	  is	  close	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  corner	  solution	  of	  a	  monetary	  union	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK.	  However,	  we	  note	  that	  this	  proposal,	  by	  definition,	  would	  fall	  short	  of	  a	  full	  monetary	  union	  with	  political	  union	  and	  therefore	  in	  our	  view	  is	  doomed	  to	  failure.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  and	  as	  the	  recent	  euro	  crisis	  has	  amply	  demonstrated,	  there	  is	  nothing	  irrevocable	  about	  an	  exchange	  rate	  that	  is	  part	  of	  a	  monetary	  union	  but	  where	  a	  political	  union	  is	  absent:	  there	  will	  always	  be	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  currency	  will	  leave	  the	  union	  in	  times	  of	  crises.	  Second,	  the	  probability	  of	  leaving	  a	  monetary	  union	  will	  be	  greatly	  increased	  if	  the	  kind	  of	  shocks	  hitting	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  different,	  or	  with	  common	  shocks	  having	  a	  differential	  impact	  on	  the	  two	  economies.	  	  	  We	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  highly	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  since	  it	  would	  become	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  hydrocarbons	  and	  the	  important	  influence	  of	  this	  on	  both	  the	  real	  and	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  design	  of	  an	  exchange	  rate	  policy.	  By	  failing	  so	  to	  do	  the	  current	  proposal	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  simply	  cannot	  be	  a	  long	  run	  solution	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  And	  since	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution	  neither	  can	  it	  be	  a	  short-­‐term	  solution	  since,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  this	  paper,	  expectations	  exert	  such	  a	  powerful	  influence	  over	  exchange	  rates	  and	  other	  asset	  prices/	  yields	  that	  the	  long	  term	  becomes	  the	  short	  term	  very	  rapidly.	  Indeed,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  proposed	  regime	  has	  clearly	  not	  
been	  helped	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Government’s	  statement	  issued	  on	  the	  23	  April	  2013:	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Government	  is	  clear	  that	  post-­‐independence	  it	  will	  always	  be	  up	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Scotland,	  and	  their	  elected	  government,	  to	  decide	  what	  our	  currency	  should	  be’	  (Currency	  Choices	  for	  an	  Independent	  Scotland,	  April	  2003).	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  is	  a	  clear	  statement	  to	  financial	  markets	  that	  although	  the	  people	  of	  Scotland	  may	  vote	  for	  independence	  with	  a	  sterling	  currency	  union,	  post	  independence	  the	  Scottish	  government	  may	  pick	  a	  different	  regime.	  	  We	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  paper	  that	  recognising	  the	  important	  implications	  of	  North	  Sea	  Oil	  on	  Scotland’s	  real	  and	  nominal	  exchange	  rates	  leads	  us	  inevitably	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  should	  have	  a	  separate	  currency	  and	  this	  should	  be	  flexibly	  related	  to	  other	  currencies	  and	  we	  have	  considered	  a	  number	  of	  options	  in	  that	  case.	  In	  sum,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  Scotland	  should	  have	  some	  form	  of	  a	  managed	  float,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Norway,	  perhaps	  by	  allowing	  the	  Scots	  pound	  to	  crawl	  against	  a	  basket	  of	  currencies.	  Only	  exchange	  rate	  choices	  which	  recognise	  the	  diversified	  trading	  nature	  of	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  hydrocarbon	  sector	  are	  going	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  credible	  by	  financial	  markets	  and	  offer	  Scottish	  policy	  makers	  the	  adjustment	  mechanism	  they	  will	  clearly	  need	  in	  an	  independent	  country.	  History	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  that	  are	  not	  tied	  down	  by	  a	  political	  union	  and	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  country	  an	  appropriate	  adjustment	  mechanism	  will	  not	  survive.	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